Abstract-We study secret communication for broadcast channels with two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper. The transmitter sends two independent confidential messages to the legitimate receivers which have to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. Here, each legitimate receiver is interested in one confidential message having the other one already as side information available. This problem arises for example in the broadcast phase in a bidirectional relay network, where a relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two nodes while keeping the communication secure from an eavesdropper outside the network. We provide achievable rate regions and an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks a transmitted signal is received by intended users but can also be overheard by non-legitimate receivers. Thus, operators of such networks are interested in keeping the communication secret from eavesdroppers outside the network. Since secrecy techniques on higher layers are usually based on the assumption of insufficient computational capabilities of non-legitimate receivers, the use of physical layer secrecy techniques is becoming more and more attractive.
Physical layer secrecy was initiated by Wyner's seminal work [1] , in which he introduced the wiretap channel which characterizes the scenario with one transmitter, one receiver, and one eavesdropper. Since then, there has been a growing interest in physical layer secrecy, cf. for example [2, 3] . For instance, the approach of Wyner was extended by Csiszár and Körner to the broadcast channel with confidential messages [4] . There are also other extensions to multi-user settings such as the MAC with confidential messages [5] , the interference channel with confidential messages [6] , the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential messages [7, 8] , or the two-way wiretap channel [9] .
In this work we consider the broadcast channel with two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper as shown in each legitimate receiver is interested in merely one message while having the other confidential message already as side information available for decoding. The eavesdropper wants to intercept the communication having no side information about the confidential messages available.
The problem at hand is motivated by the concept of bidirectional relaying in a three-node network, where a relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol [10, 11] . In the initial MAC phase both nodes transmit their messages to the relay node which decodes them. Assuming that in the first phase the eavesdropper was absent or not able to intercept information about the messages, the succeeding broadcast phase corresponds to the above described broadcast channel with receiver side information. In this context, it is also known as the bidirectional broadcast wiretap channel (BBWC). Transmit strategies for the BBWC are also studied in [12, 13] . Privacy within the bidirectional relay network is studied in [14, 15] .
II. BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION
Let X be the input set and Y 1 , Y 2 , and Z be the output sets of the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper. Then for input and output sequences x n ∈ X n and y
n ∈ Z n of length n, the discrete memoryless broadcast channel is given by
Since we do not allow any cooperation between the receiving nodes, it is sufficient to consider the marginal transition probabilities
In this work we consider the standard model with a block code of arbitrary but fixed length n.
i } be the set of messages of node i, i = 1, 2, which is also known at the transmitter. Further, we use
2 )-code for the broadcast channel with receiver side information consists of one encoder at the transmitter
and decoders at the legitimate receivers 1 and 2
where the element 0 in the definition of the decoders is included for convenience only and plays the role of an erasure symbol.
When the transmitter has sent the message m = (m 1 , m 2 ), and the legitimate receivers have received y n 1 and y n 2 , the decoder at receiver 1 is in error if g 1 (y n 1 , m 1 ) = m 2 . Accordingly, the decoder at receiver 2 is in error if g 2 (y n 2 , m 2 ) = m 1 . We denote the average probability of error at receiver i by μ
The ignorance of the eavesdropper about the confidential messages m 1 ∈ M 1 and m 2 ∈ M 2 is measured by the concept of equivocation. Here, the equivocation rate
characterizes the secrecy level of the confidential messages. The higher the equivocation rate is, the more ignorant the eavesdropper about the confidential messages is.
+ is said to be achievable for the broadcast channel with receiver side information if for any δ > 0 there is an n(δ) ∈ N and a sequence of (n, M
The set of all achievable rate pairs is the secrecy capacity region of the broadcast channel with receiver side information.
Remark 1: Note that condition (1) on the joint equivocation rate immediately implies for the single equivocation rates that
are also satisfied, cf. [16, Lemma 15] for details.
In the following sections we present two achievable secrecy rate regions and an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the broadcast channel with receiver side information.
III. SECRET KEY APPROACH
To keep the confidential messages secret from the eavesdropper, we make explicitly use of the available side information at the legitimate receivers in this approach.
Theorem 1: An achievable secrecy rate region for the broadcast channel with receiver side information is given by the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 2 + that satisfy
Proof: Recall the broadcast situation considered here. The relay wants to transmit messages m 1 and m 2 while at each receiver one of them is already as side information available. The key idea is to interpret each message as a secret key for the other message and use them as an one-time pad [17] . In more detail, the relay encodes a combined XOR-message
and transmits it to both receivers. Then, this corresponds to a multicast problem and, therefore, the transmission will only be successful if the rates R 1 and R 2 satisfy (2).
If the receivers have decoded the combined message m, they use their own message as side information to conclude on the other one, i.e., m
Since all messages are independent, the eavesdropper is not able to conclude on the confidential messages m 1 or m 2 even if it is able to decode the combined message m. Thus, the secrecy condition (1) is obviously satisfied.
This approach exploits the structure of the network and makes use of the available side information at the receivers to guarantee the confidentiality of the transmitted messages. A drawback of this approach is that both rates are limited by the worst channel.
IV. CHANNEL CODING APPROACH
In this approach we exploit the nature of the wireless channel to establish the secret communication.
Theorem 2: An achievable secrecy rate region for the broadcast channel with receiver side information is given by the set of all rate pairs
for random variables
It is sufficient to show that the rate region given by the set of all rate pairs
, is achievable with perfect secrecy, cf. (1). Then, the region (3) with the prefixed random variable V follows immediately from standard arguments as in [4, Lemma 4] .
A. Random Codebook Generation and Coding
The most important part is the construction of a codebook with a product structure similarly as in [4] . Thereby, one part is designated for the messages to transmit and the other one is spent for additional randomization. This is done in such a way that the eavesdropper is forced to decode the randomization index at the maximum rate its channel provides so that it cannot decode the remaining information.
To achieve this, we define message sets M 1 and M 2 with |M 2 | = . We only consider the case where these sets are non-empty and set := δ/16. We
To sent the messages (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M 1 × M 2 , the relay chooses uniformly at random a randomization index j ∈ J and transmits the codeword x n jm1m2 ∈ X n . The receivers use typical set decoding where the legitimate receivers exploit their side information to create the decoding sets. In more detail, if x n jm1m2 ∈ X n has been sent, receiver 1 uses the received y n 1 ∈ Y n 1 and its own m 1 ∈ M 1 to create
If there is a unique (j, m 2 ) ∈ D 1 (m 1
It declares that (j, m 1 , m 2 ) has been sent if there is a unique j ∈ D e (m 1 , m 2 , z n ).
B. Analysis of Probability of Error
For the analysis we introduce for any (j, m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ J × M 1 × M 2 the random error events at receiver 1:
Obviously, from the union bound we have for the probability of error at receiver 1
where we bound each event separately in the following using standard arguments, cf. for example [18] .
For the first event we know from the definition of the decoding sets, cf. also [18] , that for increasing n we have
For the second event we get
≤ 2 n(I(X;Z)−δ/4) 2 n(I(X;Y1)−I(X;Z)−δ/4)
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, the second one from the definition of the sets J , M 2 and |A (n) (X, Y 1 )| ≤ 2 n(H(X,Y1)+ ) , cf. [18] , and the last equality from δ = 16 .
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) we conclude that λ 1 (j, m 2 |m 1 ) → 0 as n → ∞. Similarly, we also obtain λ 2 (j, m 1 |m 2 ) → 0 as n → ∞ for receiver 2.
The analysis of probability of error at the eavesdropper follows accordingly with the random error events
, z n ) ∈ A (n) (X, Z)}. Using the same arguments it is straightforward to show that
From (4)- (7) we conclude that the probabilities of error, averaged over all codewords and codebooks, get arbitrarily small. From the random coding argument it follows that for n large enough there exists a codebook with the desired rates.
C. Equivocation Computation
It remains to verify that this codebook construction achieves the required secrecy condition (1) at the eavesdropper. Therefore, we have to show that
As in [4] we let X n be the input random variable whose realizations are the codewords x n jm1m2 ∈ X n . Further, let M 1 and M 2 be random variables associated with the second and third coordinate of the realization of X n . Then, using the chain rule for entropy we get for the equivocation
where the last step follows from the fact that (M 1 , M 2 ) − X n forms a Markov chain. In the following we analyze all terms in (8) separately. Since X n has |J ||M 1 ||M 2 | possible values and we assume X n to be independently and uniformly distributed, we have H(X n ) = log |J | + log |M 1 | + log |M 2 |. From the construction of these sets, cf. Section IV-A, we obtain
δ. For second term in (8) we get from the weak law of large numbers
for some unique j ∈ J and arbitrary otherwise. Then we have (8) shows that the desired secrecy condition is fulfilled.
V. OUTER BOUND ON SECRECY CAPACITY Theorem 3: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the broadcast channel with receiver side information is given by the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 2 + that satisfy
Proof: To show the desired outer bound we need a version of Fano's lemma suitable for the broadcast channel with receiver side information given by
→ 0 as n → ∞, cf. for example [10] .
Let us define the following auxiliary random variables
which satisfy the following Markov chain conditions
We follow [2, 4] and get
where the first inequality follows from the perfect secrecy condition (1) and [16, Lemma 15] , cf. also Remark 1, for some δ > 0 and the last equality from the definition of the auxiliary random variables (9) . Accordingly, we get also get
Again, from the perfect secrecy condition (1) we also get
As in [4] we analyze the mutual information terms in (12) separately. For the first term
the following expression
with
Similarly, we get for the second term
with Σ 2 and Σ 2m the analogous versions of (14a) and (14b) where the indices of the legitimate receivers Y 1 and Y 2 are swapped. For the third term I(M 1 , M 2 ; Z n ) of the eavesdropper we get
with slightly different
Substituting (13) , (15) , and (16) into (12) we get
In the following we need a version of Csiszár's sum identity [4, Lemma 7] modified for our broadcast scenario.
Lemma 1:
We have the following identities
Proof: To prove the first assertion (18a) we have to show
Following [4, Lemma 7] , we use the chain rule to express the mutual information terms on the left hand side of (19) as
and on the right hand side as
where the last step follows from the Markov chain We obtain for the individual rates (10) and (11) 
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the broadcast channel with receiver side information where the transmitter sends confidential messages to two legitimate receivers with side information while keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant. We provided achievable secrecy rate regions and an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region. We expect that an improved achievable secrecy rate region can be achieved by employing more sophisticated coding techniques which is also indicated in [19] where the transmitter sends a common confidential message to two legitimate receivers in the presence of an external eavesdropper.
